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Abstract: As demand increases for ubiquitous network facilities, infrastructure-less and 
self-configuring systems like Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) are gaining popularity. 
MANET routing security however, is one of the most significant challenges to wide scale 
adoption, with wormhole attacks being an especially severe MANET routing threat. This is 
because wormholes are able to disrupt a major component of network traffic, while 
concomitantly being extremely difficult to detect. This paper introduces a new wormhole 
detection paradigm based upon Traversal Time and Hop Count Analysis (TTHCA), which 
in comparison to existing algorithms, consistently affords superior detection performance, 
allied with low false positive rates for all wormhole variants. Simulation results confirm 
that the TTHCA model exhibits robust wormhole route detection in various network 
scenarios, while incurring only a small network overhead. This feature makes TTHCA an 
attractive choice for MANET environments which generally comprise devices, such as 
wireless sensors, which possess a limited processing capability. 
Keywords:  mobile networks; MANET; MANET security; routing security; wormhole 
attack; hop count; traversal time; WAP; DelPHI; MHA 
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1. Introduction 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) are self-configuring arrangements of small portable devices 
interconnected by wireless links, with no fixed infrastructure like base stations and dedicated routers. 
They can be deployed in a diverse range of application domains including wireless sensor and 
vehicular networks, military communications, and as a viable solution for Internet connectivity in 
fourth-generation (4G) networks, especially where nodes are located out of radio range, as for example 
in underground transport systems. 
Given their inherent self-configuring nature, each MANET node participates in the routing process, 
in addition to its other activities. A number of dedicated MANET routing protocols have been 
proposed, with the reactive protocols Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [1] and Dynamic 
Source Routing (DSR) [2], being the most widely adopted. Security mechanisms have not always been 
an integral feature or priority in routing protocol development, with the underlying assumption being 
that all MANET nodes were trustworthy. Security extensions to MANET routing protocols have 
subsequently evolved, such as Secure AODV (SAODV) [3] and ARIDANE [4], though the corollary 
of not having trusted routing means MANET routers are especially vulnerable to malicious node 
activity leading to potentially severe disruption in network communications. Such disruption can range 
from deliberately ignoring the routing protocol through to tampering with routing packets. For 
example, to save energy a selfish node may simply not take part in the routing process leading to 
packet loss, while a malicious node can launch serious network attacks such as, rerouting packets from 
their original path to an erroneous destination node and even to stealing the identity of a node.  
One of the most serious MANET security threats is the wormhole attack [5] which is characteristically 
launched by two malicious nodes, with one capturing routing packets at a particular node location and 
then tunnelling them through to the other malicious node located some distance away, which in turn 
relays tunnelled packets to its neighbouring nodes. As a consequence, two nodes from distant parts of 
the network appear much closer to each other than they are in reality. Once the wormhole has been 
successfully established, the malicious nodes can disrupt network operation by dropping packets, or 
launching more pernicious attacks such as eavesdropping and packet sniffing. It has been theoretically 
proven that the strategic placement of a single wormhole in a uniformly-distributed MANET can either 
disrupt or control nearly a third of all network communications [6]. 
There are two classes of wormhole attack: Hidden Mode (HM) and Participation Mode (PM) [7]. 
HM wormhole nodes are invisible from legitimate nodes as they do not process routing packets. They 
simply capture, tunnel and forward packets to each other and never appear in routing tables. In contrast, 
PM wormhole nodes are visible during the routing process since they process routing packets as any 
normal node. Aside from relaying routing packets to its neighbours, a PM wormhole node tunnels 
routing packets to the other PM node, giving it the opportunity to deleteriously control network 
performance. 
A shortcut link between either two HM or PM wormhole nodes can be established by either an  
In-Band (I-B) or Out-of-Band (O-B) channel [8]. The former is defined when the wormhole nodes 
tunnel packets to each other through legitimate nodes in the network, while the O-B channel connects 
two malicious nodes via an external communication link such as a network cable or directional antenna.  
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From a MANET perspective, wormholes are especially difficult to detect for two reasons:  
(i)  There is the latent variability in the environment in terms of the number of users, their locations 
and the applications they are running. A MANET can operate either as a closed network, where 
a legitimate node can be easily separated from unauthorised nodes, or as a highly dynamic 
network, exhibiting considerable intermittent nodal connectivity so making it very challenging 
to distinguish malicious from legitimate nodes. Furthermore, network devices can vary from 
small energy-constrained computing devices with limited hardware capability though to 
powerful personal computers. 
(ii) There is the diversity of feasible wormhole attacks, i.e., PM, HM, I-B and O-B channels. Each 
wormhole type has its distinct characteristic providing the opportunity to launch attacks in 
many different modes, with each mode imposing its own set of challenges for any detection 
mechanism. In addition, cognisance of the incidences of erroneous wormhole identification, so 
called False Positive (FP) must be considered in any proposed detection paradigm.  
These reasons provided the motivation to investigate a generic wormhole detection methodology 
with the aim of achieving both consistently high detection rates under a range of network conditions, 
and having the capability to manage all wormhole variants. Before introducing the new detection 
algorithm, a review of some of the existing prevention and detection strategies for MANET wormholes 
is presented. 
1.1. Research Background 
Wormhole detection mechanisms can broadly be divided in two categories: neighbour validation 
and end-to-end detection. Examples of the former include packet leashes [5] and [6] which involve 
appending information to a packet relating to either distance or time, to limit that packet's admissible 
transmission distance. This is an effective preventative strategy against HM wormhole attacks because 
outlying legitimate nodes appear as neighbours and a packet can be dropped if the transmission 
distance/time of a received packet is unrealistically long. Such countermeasures however, are unable to 
detect PM wormholes because malicious nodes appear in the routes and are considered as valid 
neighbours.  
In contrast, end-to-end detection mechanisms typically measure and analyse network node and 
route features like the frequency of node appearances in routes, the geographical positions of nodes, 
the Round Trip Time (RTT) performance of data packets, and Hop Counts (HC) across multiple 
routes. Many proposals adopt cryptographic techniques to protect the routing packets such as in the 
AODV and DSR extensions, SAODV and ARIDANE. Such packet security however, can only be 
effective against the threat of PM wormholes, and not HM wormholes because these do not need to 
process any routing packets. Moreover, cryptography is only applicable within closed MANET 
environments comprising trusted nodes, such as a company intranet where network access can be 
restricted to employees. In an open dynamic MANET with nodes continuously joining and leaving the 
network, a reliable check for trustworthiness whenever a node joins the network is not feasible. For 
instance, in an underground transport system MANET where the network structure is dynamic and the 
number of users is high, it would be impossible to distinguish a malicious user from a legitimate user. Sensors 2011, 11 
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Strategies that measure and analyse the frequency of node appearances in routes [9-11] have been 
an effective countermeasure for both PM I-B and O-B wormhole nodes because they appear more 
often in routes. If the MANET is highly dynamic however, it can be difficult to maintain the frequency 
data unless either a centralized node is assigned the task of storing the data or it is continually shared 
with other MANET nodes. The ensuing solution can thus impose a high load upon the network 
bandwidth. Furthermore, HM wormholes cannot be detected using this approach as they are invisible 
and do not appear in any route.  
Geographical location based solutions including First End-to-End Protocol to secure ad hoc 
networks with Variable Ranges (FEEPVR) [12] and Simple and Efficient End-to-End Protocol 
(SEEEP) [13], utilise information concerning node positions to achieve detection of both I-B and O-B 
channel wormholes launched in either HM or PM. The main drawback of these techniques is that they 
require every node to have a positioning device, i.e., a Global Positioning System (GPS) facility which 
pragmatically precludes adoption in MANET applications, where nodes tend to be small low-cost 
computing devices like sensors.  
In contrast, RTT-based solutions including Delay Per Hop Indication (DelPHI) [14], Wormhole 
Attack Prevention (WAP) [15], and Transmission Time-based Mechanism (TTM) [16] do not require 
dedicated positioning hardware and are based on the premise that a route with a small HC will 
concomitantly have a small RTT measure. If the RTT per HC of a specific route is higher than a  
pre-calculated threshold, the route is considered to be a wormhole route. RTT-based solutions are 
effective in detecting both HM and PM I-B wormhole types, provided that variations in packet 
processing delay times on the nodes are small. In practical MANET scenarios however, this 
assumption will not always hold because of the unpredictability of network traffic loads, which 
significantly compromises the reliability of RTT solutions. In addition, RTT methods cannot detect 
either HM or PM O-B wormholes because the time delay on these wormhole links is negligibly small 
compared to the variation in packet processing delays on intermediate nodes.  
An alternative HC-based technique that does not require accurate RTT measurement is Multi   
Hop-count Analysis (MHA) [17]. This provides an efficient solution from both a computational and 
hardware perspective, but is only effective under specific network conditions. MHA modifies the 
AODV route discovery protocol to identify several unique routes between the source and destination 
nodes. A route with a markedly lower HC than other routes is then assumed to include a wormhole and 
is avoided in network communications. MHA can detect both PM I-B and O-B wormholes, but its key 
assertion is that a wormhole route always exhibits a significantly lower HC than other routes. If there 
is no HC disparity between routes, which is often the case in real-world MANET scenarios, the 
detection rate falls and a correspondingly higher FP number occurs. MHA also targets a fixed number 
of unique paths during route discovery by using a graylist to distinguish already used nodes. This 
compromises HM wormhole detection because HM nodes do not appear in the graylist, so there is the 
inherent risk that all identified routes in fact, traverse a HM wormhole. 
A recurring feature of many existing wormhole detection techniques is that to some degree, they 
incur a price in terms of their wormhole coverage capability, computational complexity, route analysis 
and time measurements, hardware requirements and network outlay to achieve improved detection 
rates. This ultimately militates against their applicability in dynamic MANET environments, where 
nodes normally have limited processing and power capability. This provided the impetus to investigate Sensors 2011, 11 
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a new generic detection strategy to provide enhanced performance for all wormhole variants, whilst 
affording a lightweight implementation from a computational and network overhead perspective.  
This paper presents a new packet-based Traversal Time and Hop Count Analysis (TTHCA) 
wormhole detection algorithm designed as an extension to the AODV routing protocol combining 
some of the latent benefits of RTT-based techniques with HC analysis, to afford superior detection 
performance and full wormhole type coverage under a variety of network conditions. Using link delay 
analysis to detect a wormhole infected route, TTHCA crucially excludes packet processing delays 
from the RTT measurements on each intermediate node, to provide a Packet Traversal Time (PTT) 
measure. A wormhole route is identified if the PTT in relation to the HC of a route is unrealistically high. 
TTHCA significantly improves both wormhole detection performance and FP occurrence, compared to 
RTT-based mechanisms, since variations in the propagation speed of a data packet are negligible 
which means the traversal time of a data packet is proportional to the distance it has travelled.  
In HC analysis terms, TTHCA adopts the graylist concept [17] for route discovery to prevent 
wormhole nodes from appearing in multiple routes, whilst embedding greater flexibility in two 
important aspects. Firstly, it is able to identify wormholes which do not always have the lowest HC 
route, and secondly, it enables HM wormholes to be effectively detected. TTHCA is not dependent on 
a fixed number of route samples, but instead the route discovery process is repeated until a safe route is 
found. TTHCA concomitantly provides low network overheads as it does not have recourse to 
broadcast routing messages more than once in wormhole-free networks.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the new TTHCA algorithm is presented in Section 2, 
while Section 3 analyses both its wormhole detection performance and FP occurrence rate in 
comparison with existing techniques, together with a statistical significance test evaluation. Finally, 
some conclusions and future work are discussed in Section 4.  
2. Packet-Based Traversal Time Hop Count Analysis (TTHCA) 
The rationale behind TTHCA was to develop a wormhole detection algorithm able to manage all 
variants of wormholes and implementable for all types of MANET devices and network scenarios, 
without incurring significant computational and network costs. TTHCA has been designed as an extension 
to the AODV routing protocol allowing the source node to receive, in addition to HC information, the 
total routing packet processing delay ΔTTOT during an AODV route discovery phase. Using ΔTTOT 
together with the RTT of a route, the source node can calculate the PTT of the route and compare it 
with the HC to identify potential wormhole routes. If PTT in relation to HC is greater than a pre-set 
threshold, the route discovery procedure is repeated until a safe route is found. To obtain ΔTTOT for a 
route, each intermediate node must measure the packet processing times of both the RREQ (ΔTRREQ) 
and RREP messages (ΔTRREP) and include these values in a new parameter within the RREP packet. 
As alluded in Section 1.1, TTHCA seeks to integrate the core concepts of RTT-based measurement 
with HC analysis, and while these separate mechanisms have proven effectual as wormhole detection 
techniques, their underlying design imposes certain inherent limitations in both achievable detection 
rates for MANET scenarios and the wormhole types each approach can identify. Before presenting the 
new TTHCA algorithm in detail, the next section briefly explores some of these constraints which 
TTHCA was specifically designed to address.  Sensors 2011, 11 
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2.1. Limitations and Benefits of Current RTT and HC-Based Wormhole Detection Algorithms 
RTT-based techniques such as WAP and DelPHI, are based on the supposition that the RTT of a 
route is closely related to its distance and HC, which is true provided all network nodes exhibit a near 
constant packet processing delay. WAP uses a Wormhole Prevention Timer (WPT) threshold for the 
maximum permitted RTT per HC; with the underlying assumption that the processing times of routing 
packets on intermediate nodes are negligibly small. In contrast, DelPHI assumes that a wormhole route 
has a significantly higher RTT than a normal route. In practical MANET environments however, 
packet processing delays are high relative to the traversal times and exhibit a high variance. There 
exists the probability that a healthy route with a short distance and low HC will produce a high RTT 
due to a momentary high packet processing delay at one of the intermediate nodes caused for instance, 
by traffic congestion. Conversely, a wormhole infected route with a long distance may provide a low 
RTT due to low packet processing delays on all intermediate nodes. For these reasons, wormhole 
detection performance is compromised and FP occurrences increased when RTT-based solutions are 
used in realistic MANET environments, as will be evidenced in Section 3.  
The HC analysis scheme in MHA is predicated on identifying routes with a significantly lower HC 
than other routes, and then classifying these routes as wormholes. This is a successful detection 
strategy provided that the wormhole route always has the lowest HC. In MANET scenarios where this 
assumption is not valid, the corresponding detection performance is compromised. The example in 
Figure 1 illustrates the problem, where S and D are the source and destination nodes respectively, 
while E and F are two malicious nodes forming a PM O-B wormhole. 
Figure 1. MANET example where MHA fails to detect a PM O-B wormhole. 
 
 
The shortest route in this example is two hops (S-A-D), while the alternative route is six hops (B-C-
G-E-F-D), so MHA prevents a packet being routed via the shorter route because it has a significantly 
lower HC. As a consequence, data packets will be routed through the wormhole. 
The graylist attribute used in MHA for route discovery is an effective way of finding multiple 
unique routes between a source and a destination node since it ensures that PM wormhole nodes for 
instance, cannot appear in more than one route per discovery phase. This means two different routes 
are sufficient to be able to detect one PM wormhole route based on HC analysis. The number of 
requested routes per route discovery in MHA is fixed and known as the Route Reply limit (RREPlim). Sensors 2011, 11 
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HM wormhole nodes cannot be added to the graylist since they do not appear in routing tables, so there 
is a risk that all requested routes traverse a wormhole link. This risk can be reduced by increasing 
RREPlim, though this increases the route discovery delay overhead which is undesirable. In the results 
analysis (Section 3), it will be shown that when MHA is applied to realistic MANET environments 
with randomly distributed nodes, the wormhole detection rate is compromised, with a commensurate 
increase in the occurrence of FP wormholes. It also reveals that the existence of HM wormholes 
further degrades the detection performance of MHA. 
Despite these drawbacks MHA, WAP and DelPHI exhibit qualities that can be exploited in a 
unified wormhole attack detection framework. They offer for example, a low overhead solution in 
terms of hardware, computation and throughput. These features provided the motivation to investigate 
how they could be combined and extended to improve detection rates, FP occurrence performance and 
crucially, broaden the detection coverage to all wormhole types.  
2.2. Packet Traversal Time (PTT) Measurement 
As highlighted in Section 2.1, RTT is an inaccurate measure for determining the distance between 
two communicating nodes since packet processing delays on intermediate nodes have high variations. 
Conversely, the propagation speed of a data packet is nearly constant making the air traversal time of a 
packet much more accurate for distance estimations. The wormhole detection algorithm in TTHCA is 
thus based on the analysis of PTT rather than RTT.  
The PTT between a source and a destination node is calculated during the AODV route discovery 
process by firstly measuring the RTT and then subtracting all packet processing delays incurred by 
intermediate nodes. A timer is started at the source node when a RREQ message is broadcasted and 
stopped when the corresponding RREP is received, giving the RTT. Each intermediate node receiving 
a RREQ measures ΔTRREQ and stores the measured value in its local memory. The destination node 
measures the time from receiving a RREQ until sending a RREP (ΔTRREQ + ΔTRREP) and adds this to 
the new parameter ΔTTOT in the AODV RREP packet. Upon receiving an RREP, all intermediate nodes 
measure ΔTRREP and increment ΔTTOT in the RREP packet by both ΔTRREP and the previously measured 
ΔTRREQ so: ΔTTOT = ΔTTOT + ΔTRREP + ΔTRREQ. When the source node receives the RREP, it calculates 
the PTT for the route as:  
     
      Δ    
2
  (1)
In TTHCA, accurate PTT measurement must be provided by each intermediate node to enable the 
source node to effectively detect wormhole infected routes. In [18], IEEE 802.11b compliant hardware 
was shown to be able to measure data packet traversal times with an average error of between 3.9 ns 
and 7 ns depending on the network environment i.e., indoors or outdoors. In Section 3.3, it will be 
proven TTHCA can tolerate much higher error measurement margins, resulting in no extra hardware 
being required to perform the time measurements.  
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2.3. TTHCA Wormhole Detection Algorithm and Extended AODV Route Discovery 
While TTHCA defines a similar threshold to WAP for the maximum link delay per HC of a healthy 
route, it relaxes the fundamental assumption that network nodes have negligible packet processing 
delays by replacing RTT with PTT in the detection process, so a wormhole is suspected in a route if: 
   
  
 
 
 
  (2) 
where R is the maximum radio range and S is the propagation speed of a wireless signal. This ratio sets 
the upper bound for all PTT per HC values, which means that no FP occurrences are feasible in 
TTHCA (see Section 3). Instead of performing the wormhole existence check on each intermediate 
node as in WAP, TTHCA uses a similar approach to that employed in DelPHI, to concentrate the 
check to the source node for minimising the route discovery delay. 
The flowchart of the complete TTHCA extended AODV route discovery procedure is displayed in 
Figure 2.  
Figure 2. The TTHCA extended AODV route discovery algorithm. 
 
 
During the AODV route discovery process ΔTTOT is measured and included in the RREP packet. 
When the source node receives a RREP packet, the PTT is calculated using Equation (1) and the 
threshold (2) applied to ascertain whether the identified route is potentially wormhole infected. If a Sensors 2011, 11 
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wormhole is suspected, a graylist is broadcasted in an analogous manner to MHA to find a new unique 
route between the source and destination nodes. This iterative process of locating new routes is 
repeated until a safe route is found which unlike MHA, importantly makes TTHCA effective in HM 
wormhole detection. Furthermore, the network overhead is significantly reduced as only one route 
discovery iteration is needed if the MANET is wormhole free. 
3. Results Analysis 
The performance of TTHCA was rigorously tested in a MANET simulation environment developed 
in NS-2 [19], with all the simulation parameters being defined in Table 1.  
Table 1. Simulation parameter settings. 
Parameter  Settings 
Number of nodes  300 
Network area (A) 4,000,000  m
2 
Network width (W)  Random: 1,500 m–4,000 m 
Network length (L)  A/W 
Node wireless hardware  IEEE 802.11b 
Maximum radio range / node (R) 250  m 
Packet propagation speed (S) 300,000,000  m/s 
Routing packet processing delay/node  
(Average, Variance, Median) 
22 ms, 3 ms, 4 ms 
Number of samples per test case: 
Wormhole infected routes (rwh) 
Total number of routes (rtot) 
 
100  
rwh + all collected healthy routes 
Output: 
Wormhole detection rate (%) 
FP occurrence rate (%) 
 
Number of identified wormhole routes / rwh 
Falsely identified wormhole routes / rtot 
 
It is assumed a single wormhole existed in the MANET with all nodes having identical   
IEEE 802.11b hardware and which, with the exception of the wormhole nodes, were randomly 
distributed within the network area. An example output from a NS-2 simulation run is displayed in 
Figure 3, where the source and destination nodes are shown in red and a 4-hop PM O-B wormhole link 
is located in the centre of the network. 
MHA and DelPHI were recoded and respectively used as the comparative HC and RTT-based 
detection techniques for TTHCA in the simulation environment. The time threshold for DelPHI was  
T = 3 ms and RREPlim = 2 was chosen for MHA because in the case of only one wormhole, just two 
comparable route samples are sufficient for a wormhole route to be detected. Simulation results for 
WAP have not been included because this protocol assumes negligible packet processing delays on all 
intermediate nodes, which renders it unsuitable for this test environment which comprised nodes with 
realistic packet processing delays. Sensors 2011, 11 
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Figure 3. Sample environment from the NS-2 simulator showing a 4-hop PM O-B 
wormhole link, with the source and destination nodes in red. 
 
 
All four wormhole types with lengths between three and six hops were analysed, and the 
corresponding wormhole and FP detection rates for TTHCA, MHA and DelPHI calculated, with a 
statistical significance test performed to assess the confidence levels of the results. Wormhole lengths 
shorter than three hops were not included because they are not a significant network threat as they do 
not attract much traffic. Similarly, wormhole links longer than six hops inevitably produce a PTT/HC 
value which increases the likelihood of TTHCA successfully detecting the wormhole. To evaluate the 
performance limits of TTHCA, an analysis of the packet processing time measurement errors and radio 
range tolerances is also presented along with a route discovery delay overhead comparison between 
TTHCA, MHA and the original AODV protocol. 
For each test case, simulation runs were repeated until 100 wormhole infected route samples were 
collected, so the total number of route samples was variable, (approximately in the range 300 to 1,100) 
and dependent both upon the network traffic attraction capability of the respective wormhole variant 
and the route discovery technique used by the respective wormhole detection scheme. 
3.1. Wormhole Detection Performance and False Positive (FP) Occurrence  
Figures 4 and 5 respectively show the detection performance for a HM I-B and O-B wormhole for 
various wormhole lengths, with the corresponding FP occurrences also plotted. 
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Figure 4. HM O-B wormhole (WH) detection and FP occurrence performance.  
 
Figure 5. HM I-B wormhole (WH) detection and FP occurrence performance. 
 
 
The detection results confirm that TTHCA outperformed both DelPHI and MHA for all wormhole 
lengths without generating any FP. HM wormholes are straightforward for TTHCA to detect because 
the malicious nodes do not modify the routing packets so their packet processing delays are not added 
to the RREP packets, causing the HM wormhole route to have a much higher PTT than a healthy route. 
This reflects the fact that the time to process a routing packet at an intermediate and/or wormhole node 
is much higher than for a packet to traverse two intermediate nodes. In the simulation, a notational 
packet processing delay of 4 ms was assumed, which compares with a typical PTT/HC value of   
≈600 ns, so even very short HM and/or I-B wormhole links (1–2 hops) can be detected by TTHCA. 
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The lower detection and correspondingly higher FP rates for DelPHI are due to the high variations 
in routing packet processing delays. MHA displays a similar trend for both metrics, though in this case 
it reflects the fact that since nodes are randomly distributed in the network area, there are many 
instances where the wormhole link does not have the shortest HC, which decreases the detection rate 
and increases FP occurrences. Figures 4 and 5 also reveal that both MHA and DelPHI perform better 
for I-B link wormholes. For DelPHI, this is because an I-B wormhole has a higher link delay than an 
O-B wormhole, so an infected route is easier to distinguish from a healthy route. Due to its high link 
delay, an I-B wormhole does not attract as much traffic as an O-B wormhole, which lowers the 
instances of identifying a wormhole route not having the shortest HC, which tends to favour MHA. 
The equivalent results for a PM I-B and O-B wormhole are shown in Figures 6 and 7 respectively. 
Figure 6. PM I-B wormhole (WH) detection and FP occurrence performance. 
 
Figure 7. PM O-B wormhole (WH) detection and FP occurrence performance.  
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TTHCA provides superior wormhole detection for all I-B channel wormhole lengths. Despite PM 
wormhole nodes adding their packet processing delays to the RREP packets, the wormhole link has a 
high PTT because packets between the malicious nodes are tunnelled via legitimate nodes which do 
not add their respective packet processing delays to the RREP packets. Conversely, for an O-B 
wormhole link, TTHCA provided better than 90% detection accuracy for wormhole lengths of 4 or 
more hops. For shorter wormholes lengths however i.e., three hops, the detection rate fell to below 
60% due to the O-B wormhole having short link delays which makes the wormhole routes particularly 
difficult to discern from a healthy route. Overall, the TTHCA wormhole detection performance was 
still superior to both MHA and DelPHi, with interestingly no FP occurrences identified for all 
wormhole lengths analysed. As emphasised in Section 2.3, provided accurate packet processing time 
measurement is maintained then FP occurrences in TTHCA are not feasible, though as will be evinced 
in Section 3.3, when the measurement accuracy is relaxed, the corresponding FP occurrence rate 
commensurately increases. 
The reason for the inferior detection performance of DelPHI for PM compared to HM wormholes is 
that a PM link is always two hops shorter than a HM link, so it incurs a shorter link delay. MHA in 
contrast, affords weaker HM detection performance because there are many instances where all routes 
located during the route discovery process traverse the wormhole, since as discussed in Section 1.1, 
HM wormhole nodes are not included in the graylist. 
3.2. Statistical Significance Analysis  
To quantitatively assess the comparative performance improvement of the TTHCA algorithm, a  
chi-square test of independence was undertaken to verify whether the wormhole detection rates and  
FP results are statistically significant compared with MHA and DelPHI. The detailed chi-square test 
results for all four wormhole variants are presented in Appendix, with a summary provided in   
Table 2, where the hypotheses are defined as follows: 
H0: TTHCA performance = MHA/DelPHI performance 
H1: TTHCA performance ≠ MHA/DelPHI performance 
Table 2. Statistical significance test results for wormhole detection and FP performance.  
Wormhole variants 
Result type  TTHCA vs. MHA  TTHCA vs. DelPHI 
Type  Length (hops) 
HM I-B 
HM O-B 
PM I-B 
3–6 
Wormhole  H0 = False  H0 = False 
FP  H0 = False  H0 = False 
PM O-B 
3 
Wormhole  H0 = True  H0 = False 
FP  H0 = False  H0 = False 
4–6 
Wormhole  H0 = False  H0 = False 
FP  H0 = False  H0 = False 
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The results conclusively prove that the difference in wormhole detection rates observed between 
TTHCA and DelPHI is statistically significant for all wormhole variants. Similarly for the TTHCA and 
MHA case, all observed wormhole detection performance differences are also significant except for 
the 3-hop PM O-B wormhole, where the null hypothesis was upheld for the reasons discussed earlier 
(see Figure 7). In terms of the FP occurrence performance, the null hypothesis is rejected in all cases. 
3.3. Tolerance of Time Measurement Errors and Radio Range Variations in TTHCA 
The next series of experiments analysed both the accuracy of packet processing time measurement 
and the maximum radio coverage variance per node necessary to maintain a predefined TTHCA 
wormhole detection rate of at least 75%. In a real-world MANET, the PTT measurement accuracy can 
deteriorate for a variety of reasons such as node mobility and limitations in the measurement capability 
of nodes during the route discovery process. Concomitantly, radio coverage can vary due to different 
MANET node hardware and variability in the network surroundings. These experiments were 
specifically performed on a PM O-B wormhole because this type of threat is the most challenging for 
TTHCA to detect. 
Figure 8. TTHCA time measurement error tolerance per node for a PM O-B wormhole (WH). 
 
 
The time measurement error tolerance results are presented in Figure 8. A random error ξ = ±K% 
was introduced to each node measurement and the equivalent wormhole detection and FP rates 
analysed. K was set as a percentage of the median packet processing delay upon a MANET node  
(4 ms). The results confirm that relaxing the time measurement accuracy produced a correspondingly 
lower wormhole detection rate and higher FP incidence, since the measurements must be sufficiently 
accurate if they are to be compared with the median packet processing delay. Despite this constraint, 
the experiments revealed TTHCA was able to tolerate measurement errors up to ξ = 800 ns for all 
wormhole lengths, while still maintaining a detection rate of greater than 80%. This vindicates the 
premise in Section 2.2 that achieving satisfactory packet processing delay measurement accuracy on 
intermediate nodes is feasible without recourse for additional hardware. 
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The radio range variation results are displayed in Figure 9. A random variable γ representing the 
radio range loss per node is introduced, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ N% and N is the maximum permissible radio 
range variation per node, given the peak MANET node coverage is 250 m (see Table 1). Figure 9 
reveals that higher variations in node radio coverage lead to a corresponding degradation in wormhole 
detection rates, though crucially TTHCA is still able to maintain a detection rate for wormholes of 4 or 
more hops of at least 75% when N = 20%, which corresponds to a radio range between 200 m and  
250 m. Similarly for a 6-hop wormhole, the detection rate is at least 80% even for a MANET 
environment where N = 40% i.e., a nodal radio range between  150 m and 250 m.  Interestingly, 
variations in the radio range of MANET nodes did not lead to FP occurrences because the threshold 
employed by the TTHCA algorithm in (2) is based upon the maximum radio range per node, so radio 
coverage losses simply decrease the PTT/HC ratio for these routes. 
Figure 9. Radio coverage variation tolerances for TTHCA in detecting a PM O-B wormhole (WH). 
 
3.4. Route Discovery Delay 
Finally, to appraise the computational time overhead introduced by the TTHCA algorithm, the route 
discovery delay was calculated and compared with the original AODV protocol. MHA was also used 
in these experiments to demonstrate the reduced delay achieved by TTHCA in replacing RREPlim with 
the threshold in (2). Route discovery delays were measured for both a wormhole infected MANET 
environment, where a 4-hop PM O-B wormhole was assumed, together with a wormhole-free network. 
The results in Table 3 are based on the average route discovery delay for 100 route discovery samples 
for each protocol. They show that as TTHCA required only one route sample to identify a wormhole 
infected route, no delay in the route discovery procedure was introduced compared with AODV in a 
wormhole-free network. If a wormhole existed, a graylist broadcasting delay was incurred after a 
wormhole route had been identified so as to locate a new healthy route. MHA in contrast, nearly 
doubled its route discovery time compared to AODV, regardless of whether a wormhole existed or not. 
This is because it mandates that at least two unique routes must be identified to detect a wormhole. 
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Note, these results do not take account of either the practical device delays caused by the packet 
processing time measurements or the increased RREP packet length, though pragmatically both of 
these represent a very small overhead for both the TTHCA and MHA algorithms. 
Table 3. Route discovery delay analysis for MHA and TTHCA compared with AODV. 
Protocol 
Average delay 
No WH  WH infected  
MHA 92%  98% 
TTHCA 0%  43% 
4. Conclusions and Future Research 
Wormhole attacks are one of the most severe threats to MANET routing and are difficult to detect 
as they can be launched in several modes, with each enforcing its own distinct requirements on the 
detection mechanism. This paper has presented a new robust wormhole detection algorithm based on 
Traversal Time and Hop Count Analysis (TTHCA) for the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) routing protocol. Simulation results, including a statistical significance test have proven 
TTHCA consistently provides superior wormhole detection performance allied with low false positive 
rates for all known wormhole types in a range of MANET scenarios, without incurring either 
significant computational or network cost. While the detection process is dependent on accurate packet 
processing time measurements on intermediate nodes, TTHCA has proven to be able to tolerate 
measurement errors well within acceptable bounds of existing wireless hardware.  
In terms of future research, one important aim for the TTHCA algorithm is to ensure the integrity 
and accuracy of the packet processing time measurement (ΔT) on MANET devices and the prevention 
of possible measurement tampering. It is feasible that a participation mode wormhole node will 
deliberately give false measurement information concerning ΔT, so potentially compromising the 
wormhole detection mechanism. Research is focused upon evaluating the impact of malicious node 
measurement tampering for each wormhole type and investigating how TTHCA can be refined to 
ensure secure measurement and delivery of ΔT. One strategy being explored is replacing ΔTTOT in the 
route reply packet with a ΔT vector which includes the individual ΔT values from intermediate node, to 
afford the possibility of identifying suspicious ΔT measurements. 
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Appendix  
Statistical Significance Test Results  
The complete results from the chi-square test of independence are presented in Tables A1 and A2. 
These results verify the statistical significance of the observed differences between TTHCA and MHA, 
and TTHCA and DelPHI in terms of both wormhole detection and FP occurrences. 
Table A1. Chi-square test results for wormhole detection rate differences for TTHCA vs. 
MHA and TTHCA vs. DelPHI. 
Wormhole variants 
TTHCA vs. MHA  TTHCA vs. DelPHI 
Type 
Length 
(hops) 
HM I-B  3  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 61.44, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 53.16, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 61.44, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 50.00, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 66.67, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 45.40, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 68.46, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 54.78, p < 0.001 
 
HM O-B  3  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 61.44, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 53.16, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 73.97, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 72.11, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 81.69, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 70.27, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 98.51, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 83.69, p < 0.001 
 
PM I-B  3  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 46.91, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 114.96, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 46.91, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 94.12, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 46.91, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 63.16, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 36.69, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 73.97, p < 0.001 
 
PM O-B  3  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 0.72, p = 0.867  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 24.08, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 42.00, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 121.88, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 45.06, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 107.54, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 63.16, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1,2 = 100) = 133.33, p < 0.001 Sensors 2011, 11 
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Table A2. Chi-square test results for FP occurrence rate differences for TTHCA vs. MHA 
and TTHCA vs. DelPHI. 
Wormhole variants 
TTHCA vs. MHA  TTHCA vs. DelPHI 
Type 
Length 
(hops) 
HM I-B  3  Χ
2(3, N1 = 506, N2 = 1,072) = 207.64, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 506, N2 = 665) = 255.56, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 510, N2 = 953) = 179.61, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 510, N2 = 627) = 201.01, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 516, N2 = 712) = 180.43, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 516, N2 = 641) = 204.14, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 520, N2 = 735) = 178.43, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 520, N2 = 708) = 248.19, p < 0.001 
 
HM O-B  3  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 291, N2 = 359) = 78.19, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 291, N2 = 271) = 78.93, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 300, N2 = 383) = 89.62, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 300, N2 = 316) = 86.03, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 302, N2 = 431) = 81.14, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 302, N2 = 323) = 116.65, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 310, N2 = 365) = 90.47, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 310, N2 = 381) = 101.87, p < 0.001 
 
PM I-B  3  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 667, N2 = 1,144) = 249.38, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 667, N2 = 772) = 308.39, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 690, N2 = 1,027) = 260.19, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 690, N2 = 750) = 307.12, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 679, N2 = 1,045) = 249.22, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 679, N2 = 541) = 248.13, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 685, N2 = 1,059) = 259.10, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 685, N2 = 678) = 318.97, p < 0.001 
 
PM O-B  3  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 468, N2 = 539) = 133.05, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 468, N2 = 321) = 151.84, p < 0.001 
 4  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 519, N2 = 474) = 150.87, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 519, N2 = 296) = 125.92, p < 0.001 
 5  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 491, N2 = 563) = 154.90, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 491, N2 = 378) = 231.71, p < 0.001 
 6  Χ
2 (3, N1 = 579, N2 = 538) = 195.14, p < 0.001  Χ
2(3, N1 = 579, N2 = 344) = 210.20, p < 0.001 
 
The nomenclature used in these Tables is: X
2 is the chi-square value, N1 is the number of route 
samples used as the basis for the TTHCA results; N2 is the corresponding number of MHA/DelPHI 
route samples and p is the probability the observed difference between TTHCA and MHA/DelPHI is 
not statistically significant. 
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